“Are Attack Helicopters Obsolete?” – A Rebuttal
I don’t believe we can call time on these battlefield predators just yet...
Recently, Trenchart posted an article entitled “Are attack helicopters obsolete?”. A detailed article, it argued that yes, given the battlefield reality in Ukraine, the rise of powerful drone forces, and in particular, the cost and training involved compared to drones, these battlefield hunters have had their day and must cede to the unstoppable rise of the drone. It’s not the only article to ask, are helicopters in general going extinct? The warnings are being written regularly.
I think differently, though and offer my humble rebuttal. I don’t believe the attack helicopter can be consigned to history just yet...
Battlefield Realities
Ukraine has indeed been a brutal wake-up call for militaries across the world. Witness the harsh lessons learnt by NATO commanders at the hands of Ukrainian Drone operators, playing as ‘Red Team’ in the recent Hedgehog 25 training.
The huge numbers of men and machines destroyed in the relentless war in Ukraine, paint a picture of a need to innovate, adapt and survive at an exceedingly rapid pace. This does not, however, automatically mean that all current modern weapons are immediately rendered obsolete and subservient to the power of the drone (discussed later in this article) or the rapid rise and deployment of the likes of DELTA, a battlefield management solution.
It is not that current weapons are suddenly obsolete, but they must be quickly reconsidered in their role on the battlefield. The attack helicopter is no different.
Yes, the Ukrainian battlefield is exceedingly hostile to helicopters. Not just the ever-present threat of a hidden Surface To Air missile system, but now, the threat of drones. But change the role of the attack helicopter and suddenly, it not only still has a part to play, but can play it well.
Drone hunting for example. Take the MI-24 HIND, a prime attack helicopter example, deployed by both sides in the War in Ukraine. Ordinary developed in the 1980’s, the MI-24 (NATO reporting name ‘Hind’) was developed by the Soviets as something of a ‘flying tank’, with heavy armour (for a helicopter) and heavy weaponry including rockets, bombs, anti-tank missiles, cannons and/or machine guns.
The Hind D variant is fast, able to be equipped with a variety of weapons and comes as standard with a chin-mounted rotary machine gun; this makes the helicopter a natural drone hunter. Many a Shahed drone has been destroyed by an intercepting MI-24, which can reach speeds of over 299 mph. It also doesn’t need to get that close to a drone to score a kill, able to engage from a good distance depending on its weapons load.
The example given above, is in addition to what are already standard capabilities of attack helicopters. For example, protective systems such as flares and chaff to defend against anti-aircraft missiles, and the possibility of taking the American example for their operations in Venezuela, and allowing helicopters to be escorted by drones into hostile areas. What is to stop an attack helicopter entering a particular part of the battlefield escorted by its own interceptor drones, to prevent its demise by enemy FPV drones or even Surface to Air missiles (if the interceptor drones are sufficiently fast and advanced enough)? Whilst far from standard issue at present, the technology is there to allow such a thing.
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The Power Of The Drone
There can be little doubt that drones in their many, varied and growing numbers of forms are deadly weapons on the modern battlefield. Whilst Ukraine has not been the first drone war (drones have existed in some form or another since 1916, or even longer ago if you include unmanned balloons), it has certainly been the war where the use of drones has become extensive, by both sides.
Drones are now deployed for a variety of missions. Loitering munitions haunt the skies, seeking targets. FPV drones attack front-line positions, observed by recon drones. Russian amikaze drones attack Ukraine’s cities, opposed by Ukraine’s increasingly diverse range of interceptor drones, whilst Ukraine’s own long-range drones now menace the Russian economy ceaselessly. Never mind the vast and increasing arsenal of various kinds of ground-based drones and sea-based drones.
The helicopter is not immune to drone attack, as evidenced by the recent downing of a Russian KA-52 attack helicopter and the killing of its crew by follow-up FPV drones. So surely, if drones can fulfil so many battlefield roles, the likes of artillery, helicopters and tanks face the threat of extinction?
Not necessarily.
An FPV drone can attack with great precision, but has difficulty operating in bad weather and amongst environments with extensive Electronic Warfare defences. They are also limited in their explosive yield. An artillery piece, meanwhile, can operate from further away and without the same issues with Electronic Warfare, depending on the shell used; never mind that the explosive power is considerably greater and its delivery, faster and so less able to be intercepted. FPV drones are the bane of armoured vehicles everywhere, but can be suppressed and shot down sufficiently so that the armoured mass of a tank can bring its powerful direct-strike cannons and machine guns to bear on the enemy, to devastating effect.
So too, can the helicopter leverage its own advantages. FPV drones can be deadly against individual helicopters but as discussed in the previous paragraphs, what if helicopters were escorted by interceptor drones? Or what if the skies were cleared before the helicopter’s mission, using friendly drones and Electronic Warfare to provide localized drone-superiority? Then the helicopters advantages of long-loitering time as well as accurate, long-range and varied weapon systems can be brought to bear. Drones do not often carry different, separate weapon loads where as the helicopter has the option to be armed with a variety of different munitions.
Cost and Benefit
As a business systems analyst in my real job, I am acutely familiar with an exercise called ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis’.
Quite simply this is comparing the costs of any project, endeavour, technology etc and recording the benefits of it in comparison to comparable technologies, project’s etc.
At least on the surface, when one compares drones to attack helicopters, the costs and benefits appear to favour the drones.
Individually drones are exceedingly inexpensive in comparison to a typical attack helicopter. FPV drones can cost as little as $200, an interceptor drone as little as $3000. Even a Shahed kamikaze drone clocks in at just $30,000. Drones are cheaper than multi-million pound attack helicopters; they are also much quicker to produce. The cost difference becomes especially stark when a simple FPV drone is capable of taking down a multimillion-dollar attack helicopter; the cost comparison favours the drone within these limited specifics.
However, drones do not operate in isolation. They require pilots just like attack helicopters. There is still a human in the loop despite the rise and investment in AI targeting and AI swarm technology; these technologies have not yet taken over human jobs. On the battlefield as it is now, we’re simply not there yet with regard to full autonomous targeting and full auto-piloting; indeed from an ethical and moral point of view, we should never get there; there should always be a human pulling the trigger in the end, somewhere along the ‘kill-chain’.
A human pilot is still required. This is where the cost-benefit equation starts to get a little more murky.
Certainly to equip and train a drone pilot takes considerably less time and investment compared to a helicopter pilot (for example, around 5 months for an interceptor pilot), but the big difference with a drone pilot to a helicopter pilot is that the drone pilot is potentially placed in considerably more peril than the helicopter pilot.
Apart from some exceptions with regard to drone pilots of particular types of drone, many drone pilots will find themselves perilously close to the front line, operating out of a van. They do not operate in isolation but in small squads with various individuals with consistent roles in the execution of their duties. They must primarily still be trained for close-quarters combat and they must be aware of their own surroundings in the execution of their duties, even whilst piloting a drone.
A helicopter pilot is an individual trained for their specific task; that of piloting and operating a helicopter. They do not have to change roles, except perhaps in the circumstances where their helicopter is shot down; in which case they must become a survivalist.
Training an individual drone pilot is still cheaper than training an individual helicopter pilot, but training still has to happen in the first place; they still need time, technology, tactics, doctrine and integration with fellow units. They still need to be commanded, assessed regularly, and they still need recovery when they are attacked themselves.
Drone pilots are now priority targets for both sides in the war in Ukraine. These individuals, whilst inflicting severe damage on their adversaries, are also at considerable risk from their enemies.
Then there is the benefits aspect to this analysis
Yes, on a good day, an FPV drone, for example, can very effectively perform a variety of battlefield rules. It can provide quasi-reconnaissance capability, precision strike and harassment actions.
However, certain kinds of drone are exceedingly susceptible to electronic warfare and an increasing arsenal of anti-drone technologies. The Marlet missiles, for example, recently deployed on Royal Navy Wildcat helicopters are an example of updated anti-drone technology. Cheap, small and effective missiles, designed specifically to counter everything up to and including Shahed-sized drones. Never mind the leverage of specific interceptor drones designed to take down other drones, and the proliferation of shotguns to frontline units, and the increasing ability of individual soldiers to target and destroy FPV drones using updated scopes and types of ammunition. The drone is still a deadly battlefield weapon, but the ability to counter it is constantly improving.
The helicopter, on the other hand, can survive a lot of these threats. Interceptor drones could certainly damage an attack helicopter but they are not optimised to take one down. FPV drones can do so, but only if they are in the immediate area and are quick enough to catch the helicopter; sometimes, they just aren’t fast enough, having to rely on ambush tactics.
Never mind that in certain kinds of bad weather or nighttime, the helicopter can still fly whereas primative or low-tech drones cannot. Most attack helicopters have an enhanced ability to operate at night; not all FPV drones or similar have night vision. There is the range issue too. Taking the Russian KA-52 as an example, its 9K121 Vikhr anti-tank missiles have a reported operational range of between 10 and 12 kilometres. It requires specialist equipment or Fibre-optic cables to extend FPV drone communications range past 5 kilometres, never mind the threat of electronic warfare or interceptor drones taking down a hostile FPV drone at range; plus no drone is going to reach its target as fast as a missile, cutting down on the likely targets’ defensive options.
Then there is the potential of equipping helicopters to make that cost-benefit analysis further favour them. More heavily armoured cockpit’s and redundancy systems to keep them flying after heavy impacts, especially from drones. Hard-kill anti-drone systems, attached either as standard or as a weapons package, as well as enhanced Electronic Warfare systems for specific drone defence or drone hunting. Enhanced anti-drone training and doctrine, including integrating attack helicopter tactics with other units, could further reduce the drone threat; it will boost pilot confidence and morale knowing they have the necessary training to fight drones off.
The drone is a deadly foe, but it can be mitigated with the right technology and tactics. A combined approach, as always, is essential to countering the threat. It might not be cheap or quick to do, but it would be consistently effective if done right.
Conclusion
I don’t believe any military can just ditch attack helicopters and fully invest in drones to the exclusion of attack helicopters. Instead, the attack helicopter needs to evolve or die.
New tactics and technology are needed to keep the attack helicopter in the fight. Existing airframes, crews and tactics must change. Drone hunting might be favoured over tank hunting; mission profiles will need to be amended. Crews will need to be retrained to consider the new battlefield environment. Never mind that consideration must be made for different battlefields; Ukraine has many lessons to learn but not every tactic and technology will automatically translate to, say, a desert environment or a different kind of enemy.
The attack helicopter, I believe, is not dead yet. Just because a drone can kill an attack helicopter doesn’t mean it kills the entire concept of an attack helicopter. Maybe sometime in the future, such as a much larger and more formidably equipped drone, might replace it, but right now, far from being replaced or made obsolete, the attack helicopter just needs to change to keep it in the fight.
Because fight, it still can…
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That's a very good point!
With the technology today it would be entirely possible to remove the pilot and fly the helicopter remotely. Effectively turning the craft into a more sophisticated attack drone. I would say that's probably step one along the route of just better, bigger, more agile and heavily armed drones, that is likely in our near future.
Take an Apache, replace the copit with necessary computer systems and flight control, and away you go. Very possible indeed 🤔👍
A refreshing counter to the over-emphasis on drones.